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ABSTRACT
Two of the most recognizable competitors in this new
era of Euro-American competition are Airbus and Boeing.
These two competitors are the world’s leading aircraft
manufacturers and their competition is shaping the face of
the commercial aviation industry.

The competition between

these two companies is for the “World’s Leading Commercial
Airline Manufacturer.”

This title is currently held by

Airbus who has lead yearly production and taken more orders
over the past three years.
Boeing has fallen behind in being the technological
leader due to a falling budget, poor industrial model, and
ethical practices.

As a result of losing ground to Airbus

over the past few years, Boeing has been continuously
restructuring itself in an effort to compete in this new
era of competition.

By comparing these two companies the

author’s objective was to determine a clear path forward
for Boeing.
To make this determination the author examined both
companies while making a detailed analysis of certain
areas.

Three focus areas were chosen based on initial

analysis and the magnitude of their effects.
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These focus

areas included subsidies, technology integration, and
vision of the future.
Airbus’ early successes can be attributed to an unfair
subsidy advantage that is now at the center of this
competition.

The next aspect at the center of this

competition is their philosophies on automation and the
implementation of technology.

Boeing and Airbus have

different philosophies on the implementation of automation.
While both philosophies are sound, there are advantages and
disadvantages to each.
Finally, each company in an attempt to gain an edge in
the competition has staked its future on what each believes
to be the future direction of commercial aviation.

Airbus

has gone with the philosophy of the jumbo jet with the
A380, whereas Boeing has opted for targeting the medium
range market with the 787.
The analysis of these two companies shows their
difference in philosophies with regard to embracing new
technologies in aircraft design and manufacturing.

This

thesis examines how Airbus has risen as the “World Leading
Commercial Aircraft Manufacturer” and Boeing’s need to
self-optimize.
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1 Introduction
It was the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s
that began the shaping of the world’s modern market.

In

the present day world of economic competition there have
risen two distinct sides, the United States and the
European Union.
It is without a doubt these two competitors will shape
the future of the world on all levels.

One of these levels

is aviation. In line with the two global competitors there
exist two major competing companies in the realm of
commercial aviation, Boeing and Airbus.
In recent years Boeing has stumbled on both the
military and commercial side of aviation thus needing to be
revamped. (Sweeten, 1999)

Boeing has ceded its decades-

long dominance in the commercial aviation industry to
Airbus.

Boeing, who lacked true competition for many

years, fell to the fact that if not in competition with
anyone then you must beat your last performance.
In 2005, Airbus made more deliveries than Boeing for
the third straight year and took more orders for aircraft
for the fifth consecutive year asserting its position as
the “World Leading Aircraft Manufacturer,” a title Boeing
had held for many decades. (Griffiths, 2006)
1

Adding to

Boeing’s struggles was an ethics scandal at the top of the
Boeing leadership.
recover?

The question is:

Can and will Boeing

Airbus has surpassed Boeing because of its desire

to beat Boeing, an aggressive approach to technology
integration and an unfair subsidy advantage.
This thesis discusses the history of both Airbus and
Boeing, how Airbus succeeded at its goal of unseating
Boeing as the “World’s Leading Aircraft Manufacturer” and
the future implications that these competitors will bring
in the airline industry.

2

2 History of Airbus
Airbus Industries began as a consortium of European
aviation firms to compete with American companies such as
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. In the 1960s European
aircraft manufacturers competed with each other as much as
with the American giants. In the mid-1960s tentative
negotiations commenced regarding a European collaborative
approach.
Nationalism within each country, and barriers to trade
imposed by neighboring countries, caused each of the
European firms to be confined largely to its own domestic
market. As a result, these firms were prevented from
achieving adequate economies of scale. Also, no single
European government's budget was large enough to provide
its firms with the huge amounts of support through military
research and development and other indirect subsidies
enjoyed by U.S. firms. The European firms thus were unable
to overcome the increasingly formidable barriers to entry.
The European governments were justifiably concerned
that competition from America's commercial aircraft
manufacturers would eventually cause Europe's weak and
divided industry to cease to exist, and that outcome was
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unacceptable to them. By the late 1960s, Europe's political
leaders began to focus on the only option they believed was
available to them - pooling their resources and engaging in
a cooperative effort to establish a European presence in
the global jetliner industry. The European governments were
highly motivated, and after much political wrangling they
managed to put aside political differences and issues of
national pride.
In September 1967 the British, French and German
governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to
start developing the 300 seat Airbus A300. This was the
second major joint aircraft program in Europe, following
the Concorde, for which no ongoing consortium was devised.
An earlier announcement had been made in July 1967 but had
been complicated by the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC).
The British government refused to back its proposed
competitor, a development of the BAC 1-11 and instead
supported the Airbus aircraft.
In the months following this agreement both the French
and British governments expressed doubts about the
aircraft. Another problem was the requirement for a new
engine (to be developed by Rolls-Royce, the RB207). In
December 1968 the French and British partner companies, Sud
4

Aviation and Hawker Siddeley, proposed a revised
configuration, the 250 seat Airbus A250. Renamed the A300B
the aircraft would not require new engines, reducing
development costs.
In 1969 the British government shocked its partners by
withdrawing from the project. Given the participation by
Hawker Siddeley up to that point, France and Germany were
reluctant to take over the wing design and thus the British
company was allowed to continue as a major subcontractor.
In 1978 Britain rejoined the consortium when British
Aerospace (the merged Hawker Siddeley and BAC) purchased a
20% share of the company. (Hayward, 1987)
The Airbus A300 was the first aircraft model launched
by Airbus. Airbus Industries was formally set up in 1970
following an agreement between Sud-Aviation (France) and
Deutsche Airbus—itself a German aerospace consortium
consisting of Bölkow, Dornier, Flugzeug-Union Süd, HFB,
Messerschmitt, TG Siebelwerke, and VFW. The grouping was
joined by CASA of Spain in 1971. Each company would deliver
its sections as fully equipped, ready to fly items, a
precursor to “Lean” manufacturing. “Lean” manufacturing is
a management philosophy focused on reducing waste by
eliminating overproduction, waiting time, defective
5

products, and processing thus increasing quality and
efficiency while reducing cost.

The name "Airbus" was

taken from a non-proprietary term used by the airline
industry in the 1960s to refer to a commercial aircraft of
a certain size and range, for this term was acceptable to
the French linguistically.
In 1972 the A300 made its maiden flight and the first
production model, the A300B2 entered service in 1974.
Initially the success of the consortium was poor but by
1979 there were 81 aircraft in service. It was the launch
of the A320 in 1981 that guaranteed Airbus as a major
player in the aircraft market - the aircraft had over 400
orders before it first flew, compared to 15 for the A300 in
1972. (Brander, 1983)
The A320 was the first all-new design in its category
in 30 years.

The aircraft provided better operating

efficiency, better performance and greater passenger
comfort.

It was the first commercial aircraft to feature

“fly-by-wire” flight controls and side sticks.
standard for all subsequent Airbus cockpits.

It set the
With the

A320, Airbus started its philosophy of a two-man crew,
pilot and co-pilot with no engineer.
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The use of “fly-by-wire” gave Airbus the ability to
follow another philosophy of creating families of aircraft
sharing the same cockpit layout and the same flight
handling characteristics.

This philosophy has helped

reduce the amount of training required by airline pilots
and has proved an advantage as Airbus began development of
its long range aircraft.

Airbus entered the long range

markets with the A330 and A340 to challenge U.S. makers in
the intercontinental travel and medium range markets.
These platforms, having similar cockpits and handling
qualities to their predecessors, have been popular among
carriers.

Of note, Airbus sees the existing A330 as the

answer to the market for which Boeing is developing the
787.
Until recently, airbus was still a fairly loose
alliance but that changed shortly after major defense
mergers in 2000. DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (successor to
Deutsche Airbus), Aérospatiale (successor to Sud-Aviation)
and CASA merged to form EADS. In 2001 BAE Systems (formerly
British Aerospace) and EADS formed the Airbus Integrated
Company to coincide with the development of the new Airbus
A380 which will seat 555 passengers and be the world's
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largest commercial passenger jet when it enters service in
2007, again taking another title from Boeing.

8

3 History of Boeing
The company was incorporated in Seattle, Washington by
William E. Boeing on July 15, 1916, as “Pacific Aero
Products Co.” following the June 15, 1916 maiden flight of
one of the two “B&W” seaplanes built with the assistance of
George Conrad Westervelt, a U.S. Navy engineer. On May 9,
1917, the company became the “Boeing Airplane Company.”
William E. Boeing had studied at Yale University and worked
initially in the timber industry, where he became a rich
man and acquired knowledge about wooden structures. This
knowledge would prove invaluable in his subsequent design
and assembly of airplanes.
In 1927, Boeing created an airline, named Boeing Air
Transport (BAT). A year later, BAT, as well as Pacific Air
Transport and Boeing Airplane Company merged into a single
corporation. The company changed its name to United
Aircraft And Transport Corporation in 1929 and acquired
Pratt & Whitney, Hamilton Standard Propeller Company, and
Chance Vought. United Aircraft then purchased National Air
Transport in 1930. The Air Mail Act of 1934 prohibited
airlines and manufacturers from being under the same
corporate umbrella, so the company split into three smaller
companies - Boeing Airplane Company, United Airlines, and
9

United Aircraft Corporation, the precursor to United
Technologies. As a result, William Boeing sold off his
shares.
Shortly thereafter, an agreement with Pan American
World Airways (Pan Am) was reached to develop and build a
commercial flying-boat able to carry passengers on
transoceanic routes. The first flight of the Boeing 314
Clipper was in June 1938. It was the largest civil aircraft
of its time, with a capacity of 90 passengers on day
flights, and of 40 passengers on night flights. One year
later, the first regular passenger service from the U.S. to
the United Kingdom was inaugurated. Subsequently, other
routes were opened so that soon Pan Am flew with the Boeing
314 to destinations all over the world.
In 1938, Boeing completed work on the Model 307
Stratoliner. This was the world’s first pressurized-cabin
transport aircraft, and it was capable of cruising at an
altitude of 20,000 feet which gave it the capability of
cruising above most weather disturbances. (Krugman 1986)
During World War II, Boeing built a huge number of
bombers. In the beginning of March 1944, production had
been scaled up in such a manner, that over 350 aircraft
were built each month. During these years of war, the
10

leading aircraft companies of the U.S. had to cooperate.
The Boeing-designed B-17 bomber was assembled also by
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and Douglas Aircraft Co., while the
Boeing B-29 was assembled also by Bell Aircraft Co. and by
Glenn L. Martin Company.
After the war, most orders of bombers were canceled
and 70,000 people lost their jobs at Boeing. The company
aimed to recover quickly by selling its Stratocruiser, a
luxurious four-engine commercial airliner developed from
the B-29. However, sales of this model were not as expected
and Boeing had to seek other opportunities to overcome the
situation. The company successfully sold military aircraft
adapted for troop transportation and for aerial refueling.
(Leary, 1995)
In the mid-1950s technology had advanced
significantly, which gave Boeing the possibility to develop
and manufacture totally new products. In 1958, Boeing began
delivery of its 707, the United States' first commercial
jet airliner, in response to the British De Havilland
Comet, French Sud Aviation Caravelle and Soviet Tupolev Tu104 'Camel'; which were the world’s first generation of
commercial jet aircraft. With the successful sale of the
707, a four-engine, 156-passenger airliner, the U.S. became
11

a world leader in the commercial jet market. A few years
later, Boeing added a second version of this aircraft, the
720 which was slightly faster and had a shorter range. This
was followed by the introduction of the 727, another
commercial jet airliner of similar size, which had three
engines and was designed for medium-range routes. The 727
was immediately well accepted as a comfortable and reliable
aircraft by passengers, crews, and airlines. Although
production was discontinued in 1984, at the turn of the
millennium nearly 1,300 727s were still in service at
airlines around the world.
In 1967, Boeing introduced another short- and mediumrange airliner, the twin-engine 737. It has since become
the best-selling commercial jet aircraft in aviation
history. The 737 is still being produced, and continuous
improvements are still being made. Several versions have
been developed, mainly to increase seating capacity and
range.
The roll-out ceremonies for the first 747-100, Boeing
next big step, took place in 1968 at the massive new
factory in Everett, WA about an hour's drive from Boeing's
Seattle home. The aircraft made its first flight a year
later. The 747 had an intercontinental range and a larger
12

seating capacity than Boeing's previous aircraft.

In

January 1970 the first 747, a four-engine long-range
airliner, flew its first commercial flight. This famous
aircraft completely changed the way of flying, with its
450-passenger seating capacity and its upper deck.
Until recently, Boeing had been the only aircraft
manufacturer to offer such an airliner and has delivered
near to 1,400 units. Now, Airbus will offer the A380, which
when delivered will be the largest operational airliner. To
keep up; as with most of Boeing’s aircraft, the 747 has
undergone continuous improvements to keep it
technologically up-to-date. Larger versions have also been
developed by stretching the upper deck.
Looking back at the 1970s, there was a heavy recession
in the airlines industry so Boeing did not receive one
single order for more than one year. Boeing’s bet for the
future, the new 747 was delayed in production and
engendered much higher costs than had been forecast.
Another problem was in 1971 the U.S. Congress decided to
stop the financial support for the development of the
supersonic 2707, Boeing’s answer to the British-French
Concorde, forcing the company to discontinue the project.
The company had to reduce the number of employees from over
13

80,000 to almost half, in the Seattle area.

However, the

707 and 747 formed the backbone of many major airline
fleets through the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s.
In 1983, the economic situation began to improve.
Boeing assembled its 1,000th 737 passenger airliner. During
the following years, commercial aircraft and their military
versions became the basic equipment of airlines and air
forces. As passenger air traffic increased, competition was
harder, mainly from a European newcomer in commercial
airliner manufacturing, Airbus. Boeing had to offer new
aircraft, and developed the single-aisle 757, the larger,
twin-aisle 767, and upgraded versions of the 737 to compete
with its growing competitor.
In April 1994, Boeing introduced its most modern
commercial jet aircraft, the twin-engine 777, in between
the 767 and the 747, with a seating capacity of between 300
and 400 passengers in a standard three class layout. The
longest range twin-engine aircraft in the world, the 777
was the first Boeing airliner to feature a "fly-by-wire"
system and was conceived in response to the inroads being
made by Airbus into Boeing’s traditional market. This
aircraft, commonly known as the “Triple Seven,” reached an
important milestone by being the first airliner to be
14

designed entirely by using CAD techniques. Also in the mid1990s, the company developed the revamped version of the
737, known as the “Next-Generation 737,” or 737NG. It has
since become the fastest-selling version of the 737 in
history, and on April 20, 2006 sales passed those of the
'Classic 737,' with a follow-up order for 79 aircraft from
Southwest Airlines. The “Next-Generation 737” line includes
the 737-600, the 737-700, the 737-800, and the 737-900.
(Matlack 2004)
In 1996, Boeing acquired Rockwell’s aerospace and
defense units. The Rockwell products became a subsidiary of
Boeing, named Boeing North American, Inc. One year later,
Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas. Following the merger
between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the McDonnell Douglas
MD-95 was renamed the 717-200, and the production of the
MD-11 was later stopped. Boeing introduced a new corporate
identity with completion of the merger, incorporating the
Boeing logotype and a stylized version of the McDonnell
Douglas symbol, which was derived from the Douglas Aircraft
logo from the 1950s. (Rogers, 1996)
In recent years Boeing has faced an increasingly
competitive Airbus, which offers some commonality between
models (reducing maintenance and training costs) and the
15

latest fly-by-wire technology. From the 1970s Airbus has
increased its family of aircraft to the point where they
can now offer an aircraft in almost every class Boeing
does. Indeed, Airbus is now competing in markets that
Boeing once had a monopoly over, e.g., the A320 has been
selected by several low-cost operators.

The aircraft used

by these airlines has traditionally been the 737.

The 747

has suffered by competing with Boeing’s 777-300 series.
Currently, Boeing is planning to introduce a new
aircraft; the 787 “Dreamliner”, and four new aircraft
variants; the ultra-long-range 777-200LR, the 737-900ER,
737-700ER and the 747-8. The 787 was originally known by
the developmental designator 7E7. The Boeing 777-200LR has
the longest range of any commercial aircraft, and is the
first airliner to able to fly halfway across the planet
with a commercially viable payload, and holds the world
record for the longest flight by a commercial airliner at
21,601km. (Donnelly, 2003)
After several decades of numerous successes, Boeing
lost ground to Europe’s Airbus and subsequently lost its
position as market leader in 2003. Multiple Boeing projects
were pursued and then cancelled including the Boeing Sonic.
The Boeing Sonic Cruiser was launched in 2001 along with a
16

new advertising campaign to promote its new motto, “Forever
New Frontiers”, and rehabilitate its image. Boeing is now
focused on the newly-launched 787 as a platform of total
fleet rejuvenation, which has benefited from strong sales
success at the expense of Airbus' competing offerings.
As an aside, on October 10, 2001, against fierce
competition for the contract to the Joint Strike Fighter,
Boeing lost to rival Lockheed Martin in the multi-billion
dollar contract. Boeing’s aircraft was the X-32, which lost
out to Lockheed’s F-35 entrant. The X-32 may have been
hampered by the requirement for a redesign after several
flaws were found in the original concept.

17

4 Defining the Issue of Subsidies
Since the average effective life of a commercial
aircraft is twenty-five years, within the next fifteen
years virtually every airplane in the world's commercial
aircraft fleet will have been manufactured by either Boeing
or Airbus.
Boeing has long been the leader in the world aviation
industry. Having survived the turbulent formative years of
the industry, Boeing's first success in the commercial
market, the 707, was the result of the use of military
technology gained from Boeing’s military aircraft
development.

This was a common theme seen throughout

Boeing’s history and rise to glory.
Airbus has followed a very different path to
prominence. In many ways it is a highly improbable
enterprise, having started from scratch as the result of a
cooperative effort among notoriously nationalistic and
independent European governments. When Airbus was created
in 1970, there was much skepticism as to whether Airbus
could succeed (Thornton, 1995).

However, massive

government subsidies to Airbus enabled it to become a major
competitor, and it is now posing a strong challenge to
Boeing's dominance.
18

Airbus slowly but steadily expanded its market share
during the first two decades of its existence, reaching
it’s self-determined "survival threshold" of 30 percent of
new orders in the early 1990s. Its successes during this
period came largely at the expense of a rapidly fading
Lockheed and a more tenacious but slowly slipping McDonnell
Douglas. Lockheed suspended jetliner production in 1981,
and, at the time of its merger with Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas held only a 4 percent share of new aircraft orders.
The loss of market share by these manufacturers was almost
exactly matched by gains for Airbus, while Boeing
consistently maintained its accustomed market share of 60
percent or more. With the other competitors out of the
picture, the battle for market share is being waged
directly between Boeing and Airbus. Airbus's continued
growth in market share in recent years has come directly at
Boeing's expense. Boeing's share of new orders in 1998 has
slipped to 54 percent, going towards the increasing
percentage of Airbus.
The remarkable success of Airbus is a testimony to the
theory of strategic trade policy and use of modern
technology as it becomes available. According to this
theory, comparative advantage can be created through
19

subsidies and other forms of protection from competition
granted to favored industries, or "national champions,"
that likely would not prosper in a competitive market. This
notion of managed trade is in stark contrast to the freemarket orientation that is generally pursued by U.S. firms
and endorsed by U.S. policymakers.
During the 1920s and 1930s, there were many aircraft
producers throughout Europe and the United States, but all
were small, most were poorly financed, and none were
dominant. Market demand was limited, and individual
aircraft were generally produced one by one rather than as
part of an assembly-line process. This situation changed
dramatically during World War II, as aircraft were massproduced in large numbers for the military; and the pace of
technological advance accelerated. In the years immediately
after the war ended, U.S. and European manufacturers
attempted to capitalize on these developments by applying
what they had learned to the production of commercial
aircraft. European firms were especially aggressive in
applying jet-engine technology to commercial aircraft, and
in the 1950s they produced the world's first commercial
jetliners.
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American manufacturers were slower to adopt the new
jet-engine technology, but they learned from European
mistakes, and their more measured approach proved quite
successful. The fact that the United States was the
dominant military and economic power of the free world both
facilitated and necessitated the accelerating rate of
growth in the U.S. industry in the 1950s and 1960s. The
need for larger and faster military aircraft with extended
range resulted in huge expenditures by the U.S. military
for research and development. Naturally; the private
companies that produced these military aircraft enjoyed
significant spillover benefits for the production of
commercial aircraft. The government provided additional
indirect support through funding for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and support of
higher education, which produced large numbers of welleducated engineers, metallurgists, and other technically
trained college graduates; and regulation of the domestic
airline industry, which provided a stable market for
commercial jetliners. In addition, rising income and output
levels in the United States, along with the large
geographic size of the country, created a growing demand
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for efficient air transport, further fostering the
development of more and better aircraft.
While demand was growing steadily, the production side
of the industry was undergoing important structural
changes. The industry gradually evolved into one
characterized by large economies of scale, steep learning
curves, enormous expenditures for research and development,
high costs overall. A high level of dependence on
technology staying power became essential, since it might
require ten years or more and billions of dollars to take a
new jetliner from conception to test flight. Once testing
is complete and production of a particular model is under
way, per-unit costs can be brought down to manageable
levels as the huge development costs are spread more
widely, and production efficiency increases because of
learning-curve effects. The increasing sophistication of
aircrafts has made the break-even point drift upward and to
the right. The current rule of thumb in the industry is
that at least 600 units are required to attain the breakeven level of production for a particular model.
As the cost structure in the commercial jetliner
industry became more problematic, and as the demand for
jetliners became increasingly cyclical, the number of firms
22

producing such aircraft gradually declined, mostly as a
result of merger and consolidation. By the 1970s, only
three U.S. firms remained, and those three dominated the
worldwide market. But three was still too many, as stated
previously, which resulted in Boeings rise to dominance.
The changing nature of the commercial aircraft
industry during the postwar years resulted in mergers and
consolidations among European producers as well. In spite
of these consolidations, the European firms could not
individually establish an effective presence in the
industry.

The success of Airbus, with its business model

of heavy government subsidization without recoupment of
costs, posed a particular threat to U.S. airplane
manufacturers. Moreover, it created a general threat to a
U.S. economy, then in the midst of mild recession.
Airbus, founded in 1969 by state-run aerospace
companies in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom was
heavily funded by these governments. Among its advantages
was a harmonious aviation industry established by the
United Kingdom and France while creating Concorde. Though
its initial market share was small, Airbus quickly grew
with the help of heavy development subsidization. In
addition, with center-left governments in power in European
23

countries throughout the 1970s, possible nationalistic
implications for Airbus' success could be seen. While
Boeing was a privately established and financed company,
albeit one with significant involvement with United States
defense contracts, Europe's aerospace corporations were
government creations, and from the beginning of the jet age
were entirely government financed and supported. When
Airbus was created in the late 1960s, the Concorde was
still under production by European governments despite
staggering costs. Boeing, meanwhile, was nearly bankrupted
by its development of the original jumbo, the 747. Boeing
was forced to lay off thousands of workers and to provide
private sector airlines with favorable purchase terms in
order to both secure much needed deposits and establish the
order base to spur further development and production.
Eventually, the U.S. government did provide minimal
assistance, mostly in the form of encouraging negotiations
between Boeing and major airline customers; it provided
essentially nothing in the way of direct financial support
for the 747. In contrast to U.S. manufacturers, Europe's
civil aircraft development was almost entirely government
funded.
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The Boeing 747 has been the premier jet for long-haul
international travel since its introduction in the late
1960s. Updated models of the 747 are still in production,
and it remains a backbone of Boeing's line. While Airbus
has introduced several jets designed to compete with
smaller Boeing products, until recently it has not
attempted to directly compete with the 747-the world's
largest, most expensive and most profitable commercial
aircraft.
It was at the Paris Air Show in 1991, riding high
after driving Boeing's market share below fifty percent,
Airbus announced that it would begin preliminary
development of a passenger airplane with a capacity of up
to 700--the largest in history. Despite this announcement,
after the signing of the 1992 Bilateral Agreement, Airbus
announced that it would abandon its solo effort and entered
into discussions with Boeing for joint development of the
super-jumbo. With potential development costs estimated at
up to $15 billion, a joint project was believed to be the
only way Airbus could develop a new airplane and stay
within the boundaries of the subsidy agreement. Boeing and
Airbus agreed to a one-year feasibility study of the
project, which took place in 1993. (Jenny, 1993)
25

Though the initial cooperation went beyond the
feasibility study, the companies eventually decided not to
proceed with the joint project. Even during periods of
putative cooperation, the two companies pursued different
tracks, perhaps in preparation for the eventual need to
proceed on their own. The cooperation ended in 1995, with
each side claiming that the market would not bear the
introduction of such a large airplane. Airbus then
proceeded to develop just such an airplane independently.
Airbus continued to proceed with its plans and
development, albeit in a low profile manner, despite the
breakdown of cooperation with Boeing, and negative reports
by aviation analysts. From 1997 to 2000, the company
continued to talk to potential partners and customers about
the need for a super-jumbo, and became convinced that its
future depended on having its own top of the line superjumbo. It appears that Airbus' decision to develop the
super-jumbo was not strictly a business decision, but was
also motivated, at least in part, by strategic
considerations. Airbus announced tentative plans to proceed
with the A380 in mid-2000, contingent upon receiving forty
to fifty orders from airline customers. The orders were
received, and in December 2000 Airbus officially announced
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the launch of the 500 to 900 seat A380, to be delivered
sometime around 2006.
The reaction of Boeing and the U.S. government was
swift and predictable. Both parties claimed that, despite
the conversion of Airbus from a French holding company to a
joint stock company in mid-2000, the program was unfairly
and perhaps illegally subsidized by European governments,
and that Airbus' actions could start a trade war. Boeing
claimed that it had not proceeded with its plans for a
super-jumbo because of the potentially prohibitive cost,
and that for Airbus to develop such an airplane with the
backing of European governments would be a violation of
world trade conventions. Airbus responded that everything
it was doing was within the letter of the agreements signed
by the European Union and United States, and that it would
proceed as planned.

27

5 The Trade Agreement
From the first days of its existence, Airbus was the
beneficiary of direct subsidies in the form of government
loans for aircraft development. These loans, amounting to
between 70 and 90 percent of an aircraft's development
cost, carried below-market interest rates. Rather than
repaying the loans according to a prescribed timetable, as
typically would occur in a competitive market, the Airbus
firms repaid the loans from revenue received as new
aircraft were delivered. Moreover, debt forgiveness was
commonplace, a practice that would not likely occur in a
competitive market.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. trade officials
and aircraft manufacturers protested that these subsidies
violated international trade agreements and gave Airbus
unfair competitive advantages. The United States asserted
that the subsidies allowed Airbus to price its jetliners at
10 percent or more below cost (Fortiman 1989). Perhaps the
more important point is that Airbus would probably never
even have gotten off the ground without this substantial
government support. In short, U.S. officials maintained
that Europe's treatment of Airbus was tantamount to an
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industrial policy of subsidizing Airbus to ensure its
competitiveness. In the process a European comparative
advantage in the jetliner industry was artificially
created.
The European governments were unyielding in the face
of these protests, since they were strongly motivated to
ensure the development of a viable commercial aircraft
industry. They thought that this industry would complement
the growth of the entire European aerospace industry and
would thus be expected to yield social and economic
benefits that exceed the cost of the subsidies. Commercial
aircraft would occupy a pivotal position in international
trade, be an important creator of wealth and employment,
and contribute greatly to both national prestige and
national defense. Research and development in commercialaircraft manufacturing would also produce technological
spillovers for other key industries. In addition, the
United States would be prevented from holding a worldwide
monopoly in production of commercial aircraft.
Subsidies were needed to provide Airbus with some
breathing space until it could stand on its own, but both
Airbus and the governments realized that large direct
subsidies could not continue indefinitely. The critical
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goal for Airbus was to capture at least 30 percent of new
orders. Airbus officials thought that after that milestone
had been reached, the enterprise could continue on a more
self-sustaining basis and depend less heavily on direct
government support. In the interim, government subsidies
allowed Airbus the luxury of not having to base its
decisions to launch new models solely on expected profits
or losses (Cravens 1992).
Airbus defended its subsidies by arguing that U.S.
commercial aircraft producers also benefited from
government assistance, though this assistance was more
indirect. Organizations such as NASA, which is funded by
taxpayer dollars, support aeronautics and propulsion
research that is shared with U.S. aircraft manufacturers.
In addition, research sponsored by the U.S. military yields
important technological spillovers for the U.S. commercial
aircraft industry; most notably in aircraft engines and
aircraft design.
The battle over the appropriateness of subsidies raged
for the first twenty-two years of Airbus's existence. The
first major attempt to put the issue to rest was contained
in a commercial aviation section written into the Tokyo
round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
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treaty in 1979. The negotiations leading up to this
agreement provided the United States with the first
opportunity formally and unequivocally to put an end to the
subsidy issue by negotiating for a provision in the treaty
to ban direct government subsidies. Although U.S.
negotiators proposed straightforward language that would
have achieved this end, they did not press the point when
other signatories objected. Instead, they agreed on
compromise language that imposed what the U.S. negotiators
thought were significant limitations on government
subsidies for civilian aircraft production. Subsidies,
however, were not expressly forbidden, and interpretations
of the phraseology in the treaty would be the cause of much
controversy during the 1980s (McGuire 1997).
The European governments saw the treaty as a victory
and continued on their course. The limitations on subsidies
referred to in the treaty applied to subsidies that would
have the effect of harming the competitive position of
industries in other signatories' countries. Since U.S.
firms dominated the commercial aircraft market, the
European position was that subsidies to Airbus could not
possibly cause material harm to the competitive position of
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U.S. manufacturers and were therefore allowed by the
treaty.
By the early 1980s, when the Airbus A300 was winning
about half the business for wide-bodied jets and U.S.
exports were suffering because of the strengthening dollar,
U.S. trade officials renewed their attack on European
subsidies. Negotiators from the Reagan administration
accused Airbus of violating trade agreements. The heated
discussions were laced with charges and countercharges, but
little progress was made. This situation suited European
negotiators quite well, since they were essentially buying
time. From the U.S. perspective, the problem was
exacerbated by the fact that U.S. manufacturers did not
support the filing of a formal complaint. Europe was a
major market for them, and they did not want to be harmed
by European retaliation.
In 1992, officials in both the United States and the
European Union (EU) finally agreed on a bilateral reduction
in subsidies and signed what has come to be known as the
"Airbus accord." The principal element of the accord was a
cap on how large a subsidy the U.S. and European aerospace
industries could receive for product development. Such
launch aid was limited to 33 percent of the total
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development cost of an aircraft, and the loan would have to
be repaid with interest within seventeen years. In
addition, the indirect subsidies (spillover benefits from
military contracts) would be limited to 4 percent of a
firm's commercial aircraft revenue.
Since the accord formally legitimized the use of
subsidies, the agreement can be viewed in many ways as a
victory for Airbus. The failure of the U.S. aircraft
industry and the U.S. government to take formal action on
the subsidies issue during the 1970s and 1980s, on the
basis of violation of then-existing trade agreements, had
given Airbus the time it needed to establish itself as a
force in the marketplace. By 1992, Airbus had achieved its
goal of capturing 30 percent of new orders. The A320 was
profitable, and the newly launched A330 and A340 models
were showing great promise. The accord thus came at a time
when Airbus was becoming less dependent on subsidies and
could operate comfortably under the 33 percent cap.
There seems to be little doubt that Airbus would not
be in a position of such prominence today without the huge
direct subsidies that the consortium has received.
Moreover, U.S. policymakers and aircraft manufacturers
believed that these subsidies violated trade agreements and
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gave Airbus an unfair advantage. Why, then, did the United
States not press the issue more forcefully? There may have
been several reasons. One is that it may not have realized
how instrumental the subsidies were going to be in making
Airbus a viable competitor long-term. Instead, U.S.
negotiators focused on issues such as government financing
of export sales, which was a short-term consideration.
Second, some sectors of the U.S. aircraft industry, such as
engine manufacturers and airline companies, had a vested
interest in seeing Airbus succeed, and thus did not support
taking action against Airbus. Third, U.S. airframe
manufacturers feared a loss of business in Europe if they
pressed too vigorously on the subsidies issue. Fourth, at
critical times during the 1980s the U.S. negotiators lacked
clear focus and direction, since there was no unified and
well-defined position in their negotiating stance.
For a time, it was not clear whether the Commerce
Department or the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
should take the lead in the negotiations. Finally, the very
success of U.S. manufacturers served to weaken the U.S.
negotiating position. Since U.S. manufacturers dominated
the industry, it would have been difficult to convince
negotiators from other countries that U.S. manufacturers
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should receive more protection from competition.
Furthermore, other countries such as Japan and Brazil may
have wanted to leave the door open for government support
of their own aircraft industries in the future, so it is
unlikely that they would have supported the U.S. position.
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6 Competing Technologies
Boeing maintains a long practice of technological
distinction and modernization, by building new versions of
its line up of commercial airplanes; improving, producing,
supporting and modifying aircraft for the U.S. military; by
building launch vehicles capable of hoisting tons into
orbit; to improving communications for people around the
world through a sophisticated system of satellites.
Boeing has been building commercial airliners since
1927 with the first Boeing commercial jet airliner, the
7O7, introduced in l955. Accolades to Boeing as the success
is remarkable when one realizes that the Boeing
"Design/Build" process has not changed very much during the
past three decades.
The importance of the above statement lies in the fact
that despite the system being antiquated, cumbersome and
inefficient creating production delays, increased costs and
spawning a huge bureaucracy simply to handle the paperwork,
the company managed to achieve its goal. However, Boeing
must clearly be motivated to bring this World War II era
process into the 21st Century if it is to compete with
Airbus.
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Airbus Industries has quickly provided much
competition to Boeing.

The important factor is that Airbus

is provided government subsidies allowing it to operate in
the red. This advantage is not available to Boeing, thereby
enabling Airbus to afford to develop new technologies
without having to worry about passing on the costs to the
customers. This means that Airbus price their aircraft
competitively to lure away airlines from Boeing. This is
the major point of the thesis that demonstrates how the
management of Airbus worked towards achieving a state of
the art jet, without incurring huge costs.
It should be noted that cost cutting effects of the
changing airline industry resulting from deregulation in
1978 are still being felt in the commercial aircraft
industry. The competition among airlines for passengers has
resulted in a greater emphasis on cost cutting leading to
mergers and bankruptcies. In addition, airlines modified
their routing systems since they were not limited to
certain routes, as was the case before deregulation,
changing their buying patterns for aircraft accordingly.
Initially after deregulation, airlines were less
concerned with having the most technologically advanced
airplane and more concerned about the affordability of that
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airplane.

Cost and efficiency were important.

However,

with the integration of automation, affordability and
efficiency was able to go hand in hand with the
implementation of technology.

Over the past several

decades, safer and more reliable designs have been
responsible for much of the progress made in reducing the
accident rate and increasing efficiency.

Improvements in

engines, systems, and structures have all contributed to
this achievement.

At the forefront of this rolling change

was Airbus with its government subsidies to help implement
new designs.

As automation in the cockpit increased, there

have been many resulting ideas on how to implement this
technology.

As with most increases in capabilities such as

automation, there are advantages and disadvantages.
Advantages of automation have been increased capacity and
productivity, relief from routine operations, precise
handling of routine operations, and economical utilization
of machines.

The two largest manufacturers of transport

aircraft, Boeing and Airbus, have two different
philosophies on the implementation of automation.
In looking at Boeing’s philosophy, the idea of
“automation as a tool” comes to mind.

When dealing with

automation, Boeing has four areas that it considers:
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Customer input; Appropriate degree of automation; Crew
interaction capability; and Communication, navigation, and
surveillance improvements.

Boeing’s cockpits are designed

to provide automation to assist the aircrew and not to
replace their responsibility for the safe and efficient
operation of the aircraft.

According to Boeing and certain

studies, aircrew errors typically occur when aircrew do not
perceive or interpret a problem and fail to act
appropriately in order to prevent the situation from
escalating.

Hence Boeing’s philosophy is to incorporate

intuitive, easy-to-use systems, in an attempt to decrease
the hazards.

These systems support instrument displays

with visual and tactile motion cues to aid the crew in the
use of automation and more importantly to minimize
potential confusion about what functions are automated.

In

addition, visual and tactile motion cues are provided by
feedback to the controls in order to reinforce situational
awareness and help keep the aircrew fully aware of changes
occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during
all phases of automated and manual flight.

This philosophy

has led to an over reliance on the system even though the
system was designed only to be a tool.
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Airbus, on the other hand, has a philosophy that
mirrors the idea of “automation as a control.”

Airbus uses

its design of automation as a means of increasing
efficiency and economy of the aircraft as well as safety
through out the flight envelope of the aircraft, thereby
decreasing the risk.

According to Airbus, “within the

normal flight envelope, automation must not work against
operator inputs, except when absolutely necessary for
safety.

This means that it is possible for automation to

have the final input in the control of the aircraft.
aircrew can be limited by automation.

The

The challenge with

this progression is the aircrew’s ability to fully
comprehend what is going on. If the aircrew cannot
understand the automation or what the automation is doing
then they cannot effectively plan ahead or control the
aircraft during certain tasks.

In looking at these task

demands, one must also consider unexpected demands on the
aircrew, which has led to many incidents and mishaps.
Unlike Boeing, Airbus does not use tactile motion cues.
Tactile motion cues provide visual and mechanical feedback
to the aircrew.

The belief is that aircrew should monitor

instruments as opposed to monitoring the movement of
controls thereby keeping the pilot mentally engaged.
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Automation must not reduce the overall reliability of the
aircraft, which includes the aircrew.

Airbus’ philosophy

has resulted in excessive mental workload resulting in
aircrew system operating errors.
One of the most significant differences between Boeing
and Airbus is their philosophies on automation. Automation
has allowed for more efficient crew resource management.
The findings of the President's Task Force on Crew
Complement in the early 1980s allowed airplanes to be
certified for two-person operation, and this crewing was
adopted as the standard for all new types. In many cases,
especially for Airbus, a common type rating covered many
models.

Along with development was the introduction of the

first "glass cockpit" aircraft in civil service. Their
primary flight and aircraft systems displays were on
cathode-ray tubes (CRTs), which motivated the glass cockpit
description, although all types use some electromechanical
instruments as well. They have also made extensive use of
digital microprocessors (the 767 and 757 had over 100).
During the 1980s, considerable operational experience
was gained with these third-generation aircraft. As
manufacturers gained confidence in the new automation
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technology, it was incorporated and its uses were extended
in new designs.
This era saw the development and introduction of the
Airbus A320 (1989) (the first of the all-glass cockpit
airplanes), the Boeing 747-400, a greatly advanced twoperson crew version of the venerable 747 in service since
1970, the McDonnell-Douglas MD-11, a two-person crew DC-10
variant that entered service in 1991, and the Fokker F-100,
an enlarged and highly automated outgrowth of the earlier
F-28 regional jet.
The early adoption of automation philosophy by Airbus
has given it a highly competitive advantage against Boeing
and the competition in automation technology between the
two competitors has generally been won by Airbus in the
last few years.

The majority of aircrew are subscribers to

the Airbus design philosophy that basically attempts to
prevent an aircraft from getting into a hazardous situation
where the Boeing design philosophy provides control
authority to perhaps get you out of a hazardous situation.
There are several cases that show that computerized control
over the flight regime can still result in an accident if
the crew misinterprets the automation or cannot keep up
with what the automation is doing.
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A case in point is the

1994 crash of a China Airlines Airbus A310 in Nagoya. A
counter-point is that Airbus type automation might have
saved the American Airlines Boeing 757 in Columbia by
automatically retracting the speedbrakes, which were left
deployed, during their terrain escape maneuver.

In both of

the above examples the aircraft functioned as they were
designed, it was the flight crews that misinterpreted the
condition of their aircraft. To paraphrase a popular
advertising slogan used in the aviation business "the best
safety device in any aircraft is a well trained pilot".
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7 The Road Ahead
The future changes to the Boeing Commercial Aircraft
Company must encompass all fields if they are to compete
with Airbus. From the philosophy of the company to the
technical details, every aspect of the design/build process
will need to be modified if Boeing is to compete. Boeing
has been smarter ever since Airbus snatched the lead in the
civil jet market by delivering more aircraft for the first
time. Airbus is still in front this year, with 224
deliveries to the end of September, compared to Boeing's
218. The Americans' beef is that Airbus still gets soft
loans from the governments of Germany, France, Britain and
Spain.
Boeing's chief executive, Harry Stonecipher, has been
itching to have a go at Airbus. He was brought out of
retirement to run the company after it lost its two top
executives in a row after improper dealings with the
Pentagon over defense contracts. Previously, as number two
at Boeing, he was always pushing for a more aggressive line
against Airbus subsidies.
According to Boeing, Airbus can only make such rapid
moves in the marketplace because it can count on launch
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aid. Mr. Stonecipher points out that the European company
has been able to roll out five new products in the past
decade, while Boeing, with an eye to shareholders and its
bottom line, has managed one.
It is true that the big attraction of state-provided
launch aid is that if a product flops, the money does not
have to be repaid; so the risk is borne partly by European
taxpayers. But Airbus now has to continue paying penalties
long after the loan and interest have been repaid.

The Duopoly Market
Boeing embarked on an ambitious four-year
restructuring program in the mid-1990s and had hoped that,
by adopting “Lean” production techniques and otherwise
reengineering its production processes, it would be able to
produce airplanes more rapidly and at 25 percent less cost.
However, because demand for new aircraft was soaring, and
Boeing was reluctant to see its market share slip, it
attempted to gear up production rates to record levels at a
time when its assembly lines and other processes were still
being transformed. The company was unprepared and ill
equipped to handle the additional work, and numerous
production problems ensued. Antiquated computer systems,
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parts shortages, inexperienced workers, work being done out
of proper sequence, and other inefficiencies led to severe
production bottlenecks.
The merger with McDonnell Douglas in the late 1990s
only compounded these problems. The meshing of corporate
cultures did not go as smoothly as hoped, and power
struggles in the upper ranks of management detracted from
the drive to streamline the firm's operations.
Indecisiveness with regard to how best to use the new
resources coming into the firm eroded employee morale.
Moreover, Boeing's assemblers have complained that
production goals have increasingly come from the top down,
without proper concern as to whether those goals could be
achieved. The problems were so great that in the fall of
1997 Boeing even had to shut down its assembly lines for
several weeks in an attempt to sort out the chaos.
Boeing's problems have been exacerbated by the fact
that for the past several years Boeing and Airbus have
engaged in vicious price competition, with both firms
offering discounts of 20 percent or more in order to
capture or preserve market share. It is ironic that, in the
midst of one of the greatest boom periods ever for
commercial aircraft sales, profitability has been elusive
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for both firms. Boeing's announcement in 1998 that it was
raising prices 5 percent on most of its models, followed by
Airbus's announcement of a 3 percent price increase, may be
a sign that this ruinous price competition, which has been
a boon for the airlines, may be abating.
Boeing cut back the production rates of its widebodied, long-range 747 and 777 models in 1999, because of
both weakness in the Asian market and Boeing's forecast
that demand for wide-bodied models will be declining during
the next decade. Boeing has focused instead on expanded
production of the smaller, less-expensive, shorter-range
737, to allow Boeing to establish itself in the rapidly
expanding market for small, regional jetliners. Boeing has
also begun developing the 787 Dreamliner to compete in
these markets.
For its part, Airbus recently completed its own fouryear program of cutting costs and reengineering its
production lines. Although its production capacity is still
well below Boeing's, it increased production 30 percent in
1999, followed by further expansion of production capacity
over the following years. Airbus has been buoyed recently
with orders from British Airways and Scandinavian Airlines
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System (SAS), both of which previously flew only Boeing
aircraft.
The creation of the current corporate entity that
replaced the old Airbus resulted in substantial cost
savings through elimination of many of the decision-making
and production inefficiencies inherent in the former
organization. In addition, a revamped Airbus has been in a
better position to take in new partners, including American
firms. The new structure has given Airbus the capability of
raising capital in financial markets. Airbus now has much
more flexibility by significantly reducing its dependence
on government support. The reorganized Airbus is less
vulnerable to the whims of government officials, and it has
greater control over the amount and timing of its capital
infusions. While Airbus works to consolidate and expand its
market share in existing market segments just as Boeing, it
has taken a different approach.

It has expanded its fleet

with the development of the A380.

The Different Vision of the Future
The Airbus A380
The Airbus A380 is a double-deck, four-engined
airliner manufactured by Airbus S.A.S. It first flew on
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April 27, 2005, from Toulouse in France. Commercial flights
should begin in late 2006 after 18 months of testing, with
the delivery of the first aircraft to launch customer
Singapore Airlines. During much of its development phase,
the aircraft was known as the Airbus A3XX, and the nickname
Superjumbo has become associated with the A380. (Norris,
2006)
The A380 is double decked, with the upper deck
extending along the entire length of the fuselage. This
allows for a spacious cabin with 50% more floor space than
the next largest airliner, providing seating for 555 people
in standard three-class configuration or up to 853 people
in full economy class configuration. Two models of the A380
are currently available; the A380-800, the passenger model,
the largest passenger airliner in the world, superseding
the Boeing 747 and the A380-800F, will be one of the
largest freight aircraft and will have a payload capacity
exceeded only by the Antonov An-225.
The A380-800 has a maximum range of 15,000 kilometers
(8,000 nm, sufficient to fly from Chicago to Sydney
nonstop), and a cruising speed of Mach 0.85 (about 900 km/h
at cruise altitude), similar to that of the Boeing 747.
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The development of this aircraft, at an estimated cost
of at least $10 billion, takes Airbus in a direction quite
the opposite of Boeing's. Boeing recently shelved plans to
develop its own super-jumbo and pushed development of a
supersonic aircraft to the back burner as well. Boeing's
view is that in the future the market will demand smaller
aircraft flying more frequently to more locations and that
the 747 will be adequate to handle large-capacity needs.

The Boeing 787
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a mid-sized wide body,
twin engined passenger airliner currently under development
by Boeing and scheduled to enter service in 2008. It will
carry between 210 and 330 passengers depending on the
seating configuration, and will be more fuel-efficient than
comparable earlier airliners. It will also be the first
major airliner to use composite material for most of its
construction.
Prior to January 28, 2005, the 787 was known as the
developmental designator 7E7. On April 26, 2005, one year
to the day after the launch of the program, the final look
of the external 787 design was frozen. With a less rakish
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nose and a more conventional tail, the final design is
aerodynamic superior to the initial 7E7 concept.
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8 Implications for Competition in the New
Millennium
The rivalry between Boeing and Airbus has many
implications for the competitive environment in the future.
First, the growth of the global marketplace will require
that many firms be larger and leaner. As barriers to
international trade continue to fall and as firms
increasingly see the world as their marketplace and
themselves as transnational, heightened levels of
competition, with the consequent reduction in pricing
power, are forcing firms to cut costs and otherwise
increase efficiency. Recent domestic and cross-border
mergers between industry giants (Exxon/Mobil and British
Petroleum/Amoco in the oil industry, Daimler-Benz/Chrysler
and Ford/Volvo in the automotive industry,
Travelers/Citicorp and NationsBank/Bank of America in
financial services, and Rhone-Poulenc/Hoechst and
Zeneca/Astra in the drug industry) are only a few of the
recent consolidations in a trend that began early in the
1990s.
These larger firms have the potential to achieve
economies by consolidating information processing,
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marketing, distribution, and a myriad of other functions,
and otherwise eliminating duplication of effort at all
levels of the firm. Higher levels of output also allow for
greater economies of scale and scope, and larger market
share brings with it added political and financial clout.
Firms that had been shielded from competition in the past,
by protective governments or small market size, are finding
that survival is now more difficult. The age of more open
economies and rapidly developing information and
communication technology is providing the opportunity to
achieve greater economies of scale and scope with a
likelihood of larger concentration ratios in many
industries.
The effects of these phenomena have been seen clearly
in the commercial aircraft industry. If Airbus had not been
created, it is likely that the market structure would still
be a duopoly, but it would be shared between Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas. The tremendous barriers to entry,
substantial economies of scale, and limited demand for the
product dictate that this industry may be a natural
duopoly, especially since governments would likely prevent
the evolution to monopoly.
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Second, government support for commercial enterprises
will likely diminish in the future. The success of Airbus indeed, its very existence - is attributable primarily to
the massive direct subsidies it received. An enterprise
like Airbus likely could not be created in the same way
today anywhere in the world. The evolution toward a more
globally competitive private marketplace has been
accompanied by a trend toward the streamlining and
downsizing of government as well. Hundreds of billions of
dollars in privatizations have occurred worldwide during
the past two decades. In addition, European governments
have been cutting their budget deficits, primarily by
slashing spending, in order to achieve or maintain
compliance with the convergence criteria for monetary
union. The Japanese government is already saddled with
rapidly growing debt as it attempts to jumpstart its
moribund economy, and emerging Asian and Latin American
nations are pursuing contractionary fiscal policies in
response to the global financial crisis.
Bilateral trade agreements, as well as more general
trade-enhancing agreements adopted through the World Trade
Organization in recent years, also militate against the
level of government subsidization received by Airbus.
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Governments and firms alike will surely be more vigilant
and more aggressive in the future with regard to the
possibility that governments elsewhere will attempt to
create an artificial comparative advantage in a particular
industry through subsidization, as was the case with
Airbus.
Third, heightened competition will force firms to
respond more quickly to changing conditions. Mostly by
accident, Airbus discovered its own version of “Lean”
production simply through the way in which it was
organized. Various components of each aircraft are built
throughout Europe and the United States, and then shipped
to France, where they are pieced together by large
machines. In the process, a variation of just-in-time
inventory control is implicitly implemented. Boeing has
been wedded to more of a mass-production, assembly-line
process, and as a result the employees-to-aircraft-produced
ratio is around 220 for Boeing, compared to only 143 for
Airbus. Boeing was attempting to modernize its
manufacturing process when it dramatically expanded its
production three years ago and encountered numerous
production bottlenecks.
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9 Conclusion
In conclusion we can say that it is clear that Boeing
should have recognized much earlier that its industrial
model was outmoded and begun to make the necessary changes
sooner and in a more orderly fashion.

Boeing's failure to

do so has resulted in its not meeting production deadlines,
incurring substantial cost overruns, inability to integrate
new age technology, and selling airplanes at significant
discounts.

Unfortunately for Boeing, it did not learn from

what happened to U.S. auto manufacturers in the face of
intense competition from Japanese producers in the 1980s or
believed that it was immune to similar competitive
pressures created by Airbus. Past Market power appears to
have led to complacency in Boeing's case.
Increased market power of corporations will require
governments to be more vigilant in promoting fair
competition and reducing the amount of subsidies.

Boeing

needs to press this issue as Airbus can now be considered a
stand alone entity no longer relying upon government
subsidies.
The battle between Airbus and Boeing for market share
has shown once again just how ruinous unbridled price
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competition can be, and firms in similar situations in
other industries may be more circumspect about engaging in
such a strategy in the future.
Airbus will continue on its current streak of
dominance unless Boeing counters the three major aspects
discussed.

The first item is the economical debate over

subsidies.

The playing field needs to be level for Boeing

to succeed.

Boeing needs to be more aggressive in seeking

a common playing field.

Without another company to disrupt

the polarization created by Airbus and Boeing their
competition will be looked upon as that between the
European Union and the United States and their policies on
the future of air travel.
The next aspect of the competition is technology.

The

past decades have seen an increase in the use of automation
in the cockpit.

Boeing and Airbus have taken two different

approaches on the integration of automation in the cockpit.
Boeing needs to take advantage of the new technologies that
are present now and update its cockpits.

One advantage of

Airbus is that all of their cockpits have the same layout,
thus making transitions from one type of aircraft to
another easier.

Boeing needs to continue updating its

cockpits and offer airlines the possibility of common type
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ratings in similar Boeing aircraft much like 737 series.
The design of the cockpit of the Boeing 777 was a step in
the right direction.

The Boeing 787 must continue in that

path.
The final aspect is the different visions of the
future.

The future of commercial aviation is plagued by

multiple problems.

Among these problems are crowded skies,

increases in fuel prices, and increases in the number of
travelers.

Airbus’ and Boeing’s different vision of the

future has produced two different types of aircraft.

Each

believes its product will be the answer to the problems
faced by commercial aviation.

Airbus thinks airlines will

need bigger airplanes to handle more traffic; Boeing
expects airlines to accommodate growth by flying more
routes with slightly smaller airplanes.

Although not an

aggressive leap forward in technology, Boeing needs to sway
the market towards the more efficient 787, especially
during this time of increased fuel prices and increased
commuter type travel.

The future will show if Boeing’s

vision will put Boeing back in front of Airbus as the
“World’s leading commercial airline manufacturer.”
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